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War on the Edge of Europe
The Chechen conflict in a new light?
Uwe Halbach
The Moscow hostage drama has brought the war in Chechnya back into public
discussion. Spectacular kidnappings with large numbers of casualties were a feature
of the escalation of violence in the North Caucasus in the past. But never did the out-
pouring of violence from the war in Chechnya strike Russia and the rest of the world
as directly as it did this time. The Russian Governments official position on the act of
terrorism in Moscow, and its alleged link with international terrorism, is an occasion
to re-examine some aspects of the long war in the North Caucasus region.
Already President Putins first statement
on the terrorist attack emphasised its inter-
national dimension: the alleged organi-
sation of the attack from abroad. According
to Putin, an international terrorist group
planned and carried out the attack in
Moscow, which is part of a series of attacks
on targets in Indonesia and the Philippines.
On 24th October, the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs called upon all nations from
whose territories the Chechen terrorists
receive support to take measures to put an
immediate end to this situation.
Notes on the conflicts
external dimension
As expected, the Kremlins comments
regarding the hostage drama picked up on
a pattern of interpretation that has become
its strategy of legitimisation for the second
Chechen war. According to this, Russia is
fighting Islamic fundamentalist aggressors
in the North Caucasus region. This expla-
nation, which obscures the origins and the
substance of the Russian-Chechen war, has
become standard since the end of the first
Chechen war, which ended in a humilia-
tion for Russia. Since then, Russian com-
mentaries have linked the growth of
Islamic fundamentalist («Wahhabi») move-
ments in the North Caucasus with the
spectre of foreign infiltration.
This interference theory in regard to
international Islamist terror networks is
not entirely plucked from the air. From the
Islamic parts of South East Asia to the
Balkans, there is hardly a regional conflict
in which this element is not caught up. The
involvement of Islamic brigades under the
command of Emir Khattab in both Chechen
wars is undeniable. The Jordanian national,
who was killed during a special operation
of the FSB in April 2002, became a symbol
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for Moscows theory that the «war against
Russia in Chechnya» should be understood
as an aspect of international terrorism and
Islamic extremism.
In both wars, foreign Mudjahedin fought
side-by-side with Chechen fighters, just as
Chechens turned up amongst the Taliban
in Afghanistan. However, the suggestion
of links between the Jihad nerve centres in
Afghanistan and representatives of the
«Chechen revolution», such as Shamil
Bassayev and Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev,
who had been spotted in Kabul, hardly
justifies claims of a substantial and specific
role for Chechnya in international Islamic
fundamentalist networks. Russian alle-
gations about the «internationalisation of
the rebel camp» in Chechnya vary sharply,
and often seem markedly exaggerated. The
opposite side, in the shape of Aslan
Maschadov, recently admitted that 200
foreign fighters are currently situated in
Chechnya. As far as Chechen complicity
with the Taliban and Al Qaeda is con-
cerned, only minor numbers of Chechens
were amongst the international Islamic
brigades arrested in Afghanistan by US
units and the Northern Alliance.
When the secession conflict between
Russia and Chechnya broke out  which is
only the most recent chapter in a history
full of conflicts and violence  Islamic
fundamentalism only played a marginal
role. At the beginning of the independence
movement, it occupied a position at the
edges of the ideological spectrum of the
«Chechen revolution». This only became
more Islamised after the clashes with the
Russian army in the first Chechen war
(December 1994 to September 1996). The
then leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev, once said
in retrospect that Russia had catapulted
Chechnya into Islam. Islamic fundamental-
ist currents increased in the period between
the wars (19961999), when the «Chechen
Republic of Ichkeria», vacated by the Rus-
sian troops, slipped into chaos, and the
terms «Islamic State», «Sharia» and «Jihad»
were the war cries in the power-struggle
between divergent political actors within
Chechnya. The second Chechen war turned
the entire North Caucasus region into
an even more attractive point of attack for
Islamic fundamentalists than it was before,
and the regional focus of a «Wahhabi-
hysteria» in the Russian media.
A Problem of Differentiation:
«Moderates», «Radicals»,
«Separatists», «Terrorists»
«The mass-kidnapping in Moscow has to be
a moment of truth for those who divide the
terrorists in Chechnya into good and
evil,» was the message of the declaration
of the Russian Foreign Ministry above.
Since the beginning of the second war,
and with added emphasis since September
11th, Russia has criticised the classification
of her military opponents in the North
Caucasus abroad into «moderate» and
«extremist» forces, instead of generally
qualifying them as «terrorists». The West is
sticking to this distinction in its negotia-
tion recommendations with Moscow. A
«moderate camp» around Aslan Maschadov,
who is remembered as the pragmatic chief
negotiator in the ending of the first
Chechen war, and voted by the people as
the President of the «Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria», is suggesting itself as a partner
for negotiations. On the other side, there is
the «radical camp» of fanatical field com-
manders and terrorists such as Shamil
Bassayev and Emir Al Chattab, Islamic
ideologists such as Movladi Udugov or
Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev and criminal
warlords such as Arbi Barayev, who was
killed in 2001.
Moscows opponents in Chechnya, then,
form a split «rebel camp» from which,
along with the autonomously acting war-
lords, three main groups stand out:
! The group around Maschadov, the so-
called Chechen government in exile,
ideologically based on a rather secular
comprehension of national indepen-
dence, even though Maschadov fell back
on Islamic attributes for the self-asser-
tion of the «Chechen Republic» during
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his term in office from 1997 to 1999
(introduction of Sharia courts, etc.). In
Moscow, he is only considered one of
many warlords in the second Chechen
war, not as the most powerful of them.
! The radical Islamic fundamentalist
(Wahhabi) camp, comprising the field
commanders Bassayev and Chattab, is
the most active group, and receives
funding and other support from radical
Islamic organisations abroad, but which
is widely considered an alien body by
the local population. The main funda-
mentalist-oriented figures include
Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev, the first
successor to Dudayev in the office of
President, and Movladi Udugov, head of
propaganda in the first Chechen war,
and interim foreign minister under
Maschadov.
! An ideologically neutral group around
Ruslan Gelayev split from Maschadov in
summer 2000, and retreated to Georgia.
Gelayevs fighters stand at the centre of
Russian concerns about bases to which
Chechen rebels withdraw in the neigh-
bouring country.
There are two different possible expla-
nations for Maschadovs co-operation with
his former enemies: after the long and fruit-
less demands that Moscow accept him as a
negotiating partner, he saw no further
possibility of reaching a political solution
to the conflict, and devoted himself wholly
to the struggle, especially since he saw that
international politics had let Chechnya
down after 11th September; or he wanted
to force the other side into negotiations
through increasing the military pressure.
The Russian Government now also
blames Maschadov for the hostage drama
in Moscow. There is allegedly a video
recording in which he announces a turn-
around in the Chechen war just a few days
before the attack, which Moscow interprets
as meaning the terrorist action. In a tele-
vision interview, Movsar Barayev, the com-
mander of the hostage-takers, named
Bassayev as the architect of the campaign
meant to force Moscow to enter nego-
tiations. Maschadov himself condemned
the act of terrorism. But his speaker
pointed out that such events could repeat
themselves if Moscow did not agree to nego-
tiations or put an end to the military cam-
paign. The co-operation of the «Chechen
secessional government» in the act of terror
has neither been excluded nor proved.
The Illusion: «Normalisation» and
«Chechenisation»
Since 2001, President Putin promoted the
idea of transferring control of the police
and administration to the Chechens, in
order to gain greater acceptability amongst
the local population. The military in the
North Caucasus and Kremlin speakers have
long heralded the end of the war and a
transition to a civilian administration as a
precondition for the peaceful reintegration
of the breakaway republic into the Russian
Federation. At a press conference in
Moscow on 24th June 2002, President Putin
held out the prospect of an end to the
«mopping-up campaigns» carried out by
Russian military units in Chechnya, and of
strengthening the «justice and security
components of the Chechen administra-
tion». «Then, we will move to the next step
in the normalisation  we will proceed to
the adoption of a constitution». In order to
underpin the «normalisation», Chechen
refugees in the neighbouring regions were
pressurised to return to their homes  espe-
cially the approximately 150,000 refugees
in Ingushia. These, however, saw that not
even the most basic conditions for their
return to Chechnya had been fulfilled. The
war has destroyed up to 80 percent of
housing. 80 percent of those able to work in
Grozny are without work and means. The
city has neither a water supply nor elec-
tricity. Above all, though, a rigid series of
«mopping-up campaigns» of Chechen settle-
ments by Russian forces continued to exert
a murderous pressure on the civilian popu-
lation, even during the «normalisation
phase».
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The intensification of the conflict rebut-
ted all claims regarding ending the military
campaign and a successful transition to
«normalisation» and «Chechenisation»
over the last months: battles between the
Russian military and the rebels increased,
attacks were carried out against the
«Chechenised» authorities and adminis-
trative bodies, and «mopping-up cam-
paigns» occurred at ever shorter intervals.
«Campaign against terrorists»,
or war of extermination
against a country?
Even if  following the Russian guideline 
one were to generally classify the armed
forces on the Chechen side as «terrorists»,
the actions of the Russian army against
them would still be the classic example for
how «war on terrorism» should not look.
Precisely because the fight against ter-
rorism has become a global challenge,
world opinion cannot allow this action to
be sold under this name. In Moscow, com-
parisons were made between the military
measures against the armed forces in
Chechnya and anti-terror measures in
Spain and Northern Ireland: Sergei Kara-
ganov of the Moscow Institute of Europe
said in the Washington Post on 29th July
2001: «The nation states of the EU have
situations that are similar to Chechnya, for
example in Northern Ireland or the Basque
region.» Already the choice of weaponry
and the number of civilian casualties make
this line of argumentation absurd: the
measures in Chechnya more closely re-
semble a massive military offensive against
an external enemy than a limited action in
an internal conflict. In the first Chechen
war, the number of dead amongst the
civilian population stood between 35,000
and a much higher figure (up to 100,000);
in the second, the order of magnitude is
comparable. In order to envisage the
severity of the war one has to consider the
spatial dimensions of the war zone. The
military campaign is concentrated in an
area of the small republic, which is only
160 km long and 80 km wide, namely in
the most densely populated areas around
Grozny and the lowlands. The mountainous
third of the country in the south, and the
steppes along the Terek in the north are
mostly free of military action. Around 80
000 men of the combined Federal troops
were concentrated in an area spanning
approximately 60 km times 30 km. The
rebels continue to resist this concentration
because they obviously have the support of
a considerable section of the population,
even though their hate for some of the
rebel warlords of the «resistance» is no less
than for the Russian forces. The resistance
mostly feeds on the brutal war strategies on
the Russian side. According to the Russian
military specialist, Felgenhauer, the
struggle against the Russian troops does
not make the rebels «terrorists», as defined
by the Geneva Convention. The atrocities
these troops constantly commit in Chech-
nya are the main reason for the continued
resistance, says Felgenhauer.
In 1999, NATOs war in Kosovo served as
the model for Moscows renewed military
operation, which was supposed to avoid the
disastrous military blunders of the first
war. The Russian leadership wanted a «low
casualty engagement» with regard to its
own soldiers, and the swift and thorough
defeat of the opposing side. Putins «anti-
terror campaign», initially planned as a
«blitzkrieg», included arms and services from
which carefully targeted violence was not
to be expected, and degenerated into a war
of extermination. With the alleged end of
the massive military intervention, the time
of the «mopping-up campaigns» began,
which were even more devastating for the
settlements than the bombardments. This
label conceals massive terrorisation of the
civilian population. After September 11th
2001, the «mopping-up campaigns» of
Chechen settlements suspected of main-
taining contacts with the rebels occurred in
even quicker succession. There are settle-
ments that have been «purged» dozens of
times consecutively, and there are hardly
any from where young men have not «dis-
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appeared». The director of the International
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights
spoke of a systematic decimation of the
male population.
There have been attempts to civilise the
Russian military operations. In spring 2002,
for example, order No. 80 was issued,
according to which soldiers should identify
themselves, and draw up lists of those
arrested during the implementation of the
«mopping-up campaigns». Local officials
from Kadyrovs Chechen administration,
who repeatedly complained about the high-
handedness of the military, were supposed
to be allowed to accompany and observe
the military operations. However, the order
was never implemented. Masked soldiers
continued to carry out the «mopping-up
campaigns». President Putin took measures
to limit the scope of the militarys power,
and to increase it for the Chechen admini-
stration under Kadyrov. But the distribu-
tion of power between military and civilian
authorities in Chechnya remained con-
fused. The most recent regulation, a decree
from 8th October 2002, boils down to in-
creased military rule, not a strengthening
of the civilian sector.
The actions of the Russian troops not
only encourage arbitrary retribution for the
many fallen comrades (by now, the «low
casualty engagement» has cost almost as
many lives as the war in Afghanistan), but
also has features of a predatory attack. The
Russian Caucasus Army became a conflict
entrepreneur. In Russia, the question arose as
to whether, amongst the military and
political personnel dealing with Chechnya,
some forces may have gained a material
interest in the continuation of the war.
Of course, there are also entrepreneurs
dealing in violence on the other side too.
A real «kidnapping industry» had already
developed in the period between the wars 
as a main aspect of the criminalisation of
economic activity and escalation of violence
in Chechnya. And after the second Chechen
war had begun, Russian soldiers also
became the victims of atrocities.
Economic aspects of the war
in the Caucasus
Besides the domino theory, according to
which releasing Chechnya into indepen-
dence would inevitably have a copycat
effect amongst other states of the Federa-
tion, and induce the break-up of the Rus-
sian Federation, the idea that Russia is
defending a part of the country that is
essential from the economic point of view
is another of the stereotypical, mostly
flawed explanations for the conflict in
Chechnya. Is the region not a historic loca-
tion for oil production and processing, and
an important transit area? So is it just a
«war for oil»  in the geostrategic context of
a «great game» going on in the Caspian
region?
As a crude oil production area (less than
1 percent of Russian oil production even
before the war began), Chechnya is just as
dispensable as it is avoidable as a transit
area. However, oil does play a role in the
conflict  in the sense of a «civil war econ-
omy». The production, processing and
export structures, now «privatised» by
Chechen warlords, have become the main
basis for illegal trading that ignores the
fronts of the conflict. In spring 2001 the
director of the Chechen administration
touched on a taboo topic when he spoke of
caravans of petrol that were able to pass
20 Russian control-points unchecked. Other
criminal transactions, such as the trade in
human beings and weapons, pass through
the fronts. Weapons and ammunition for
the rebels are mainly procured on the black
market in Russia, from the manufacturers
and from military units stationed in
Chechnya. A Chechnya expert in Russia,
Sanobar Shermatova, says: «The scale of
these illegal transactions extends far
beyond the economy, and has far-reaching
political consequences. Illegal business
relations that link the Russian military
with Chechen fighters completely trans-
form the situation in Chechnya. Russian
military personnel are showing an interest
in the continuation of the war.»
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The «mopping-up campaigns» of the
Chechen settlements are often organised as
kidnappings, through which Russian
military personnel improve their pay.
Chechen men are arrested and their
families blackmailed. But profits are also
made from reconstruction programmes for
the economy and the infrastructure. In
March 2002 President Putin admitted that
the confusing structure of the civilian
administration in Chechnya, and the
Federal offices responsible for Chechnya
generate corruption: »The funds flow to
Chechnya and move through labyrinthine
channels». In 2001, aid totalling 166 m
Euro was meant to flow from the Federal
coffers into Chechnya. The reconstruction
of hospitals and other medical centres
stood at the top of the list of priorities.
Observers from outside and officials acting
within Chechnya discovered «renovations
à la Potemkin», aid deliveries that had
vanished and fake invoices  all in all a
huge potential for corruption and
embezzlement.
Not least the Islamisation of the resis-
tance ideology became a resource for the
rebels. Even though Moscows allegations of
substantial links between the Chechen
rebels and Al Qaeda, or of decisive military
support from Islamic brigades may be
exaggerated, there is no doubt about the
existence of financial support for the
resistance movement  especially for its
Islamic wing  from the Middle-East. Less
state bodies than religious foundations,
solidarity groups and charities in Saudi
Arabia, the Arab Gulf states, Jordan and
other countries have gathered millions in
donations. Donations also come from the
north Caucasian diaspora in the Middle
East. Some Russian sources, on the con-
trary, consider the main source of income
for the Chechen resistance to lie in illegal
economic activities that Chechens organise
with business partners in Russia.
The negotiation option
Even before the recent turning point in the
Chechen conflict, the political will for
negotiations was lacking on the Russian
side, especially as regards the military. The
Russian government held the opinion that
the solution to the conflict lies in the
«normalisation of the situation in Chech-
nya, not in negotiations» (according to
Prime Minister Kasyanov on the 4th July
2002). The negotiations that brought an
end to the first Chechen war (the treaty of
Khassavjurt in August 1996), are considered
as treason by elements of the Russian elite.
Even so, there have been contacts between
Moscow and the rebel leaders in the second
Chechen war since April 2000. Regional
North Caucasian politicians, such as the
former Ingushian President Aushev and his
North Ossetian colleague Dsasokhov, as
well as politicians and delegates of the
Federation, proved to be helpful. Most
recently, the former chairman of the
security council, Ivan Rybkin, risked an
attempt and warned in the Kremlin that
the «blitzkrieg strategy» in the northern
Caucasus region would lead nowhere, and
began dealing with Maschadovs represen-
tative Sakayev in summer 2002. At that
time, Maschadov turned to the G-7 states
with an appeal. Zbigniew Brzezinski and
Alexander Haig proposed a compromise for
the resolution of the Russian-Chechen con-
flict. Next, Ruslan Khasbulatov, himself a
Chechen national and a former speaker of
the Russian parliament, presented a model
for Chechen autonomy. During a meeting
in Liechtenstein between Rybkin and
Khasbulatov on the Russian side, and
Maschadovs chief negotiators on the
Chechen side, the «Khasbulatov plan» and
the «Brzezinski plan» were merged into
one proposal based on extensive self-
determination powers for Chechnya in
internal and foreign matters, while
affirming the integration of the republic
within the territory of the Russian Federa-
tion. It calls for a special status for Chech-
nya, with guarantees from the OECD and
the Council of Europe, the delegation of
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specific functions to the Federal level, and
for demilitarisation while maintaining
Russian border controls along the southern
border of Chechnya. The Liechtenstein
discussions were not backed by Moscow.
Nevertheless, they were judged to represent
one of the clearest indications for the desire
for a peaceful solution to the conflict in
analyses by regional specialists.
After the terrorist attack in Moscow, the
Kremlin turned against any foreign contacts
of the «Republic of Ichkeria» more resolute-
ly than ever before. Denmark and the Euro-
pean Union were the first to notice this. On
28th/29th October, the «World Chechen
Congress for a peaceful solution to the
RussianChechen conflict» met in Copen-
hagen. Originally, it was meant to take
place in Istanbul in May 2002, but was
cancelled by the Turkish authorities. The
main organisers are the Danish assistance
committee for Chechnya and the Chechen
World Congress (Chechen Diaspora). People
who «could play a role in the resolution of
the conflict, and in bringing peace to
Chechnya» were meant to be invited to the
congress, including representatives of the
Chechen Diaspora, human rights organi-
sations dealing with Chechnya, delegates of
the Russian Duma, the Council of Europe,
the UN and Maschadovs representatives.
For Moscow, the participation of Sakajew
and other Maschadov representatives was
an occasion to declare the conference an
event supportive of terrorism. This received
more than just a caution from Moscow (the
Russian side forced the EU summit planned
for November 11th to be transferred from
the Danish capital to Brussels): Moscow also
had Interpol arrest Sakayev at the confer-
ence venue. The charges include the
accusation of organising illegal armed
groups.
The mood in Russia after the
terrorist attack
Opinions regarding the Chechen war
became polarised amongst the Russian
population. Advocates of an escalation of
violence face opponents of the continuation
of the war in the Caucasus. In November
1999, 61 percent of those poled voted for
military action in an opinion poll by the
VCIOM (Russian Centre for Public Opinion
and Market Research), only 27 percent
demanded a peaceful resolution of the
conflict. In July 2000, only 49 percent were
for war, and 41 percent for negotiations.
The proportion of pacifists grew to 53
percent by summer 2001. After 11th
September, the number of people advocat-
ing negotiations reduced in comparison to
the previous months, but still reached 45
percent. A first VCIOM poll after the hos-
tage drama ended shows the following
situation: the majority approve of the
governments actions under the crisis
situation from 23rd to 26th October (85
percent for Putins position, 72 percent for
the governments actions, and 82 percent
for the actions of the secret services). Each
second respondent demands an even
tougher approach in Chechnya. 46 percent
(12 percent more than in the previous
month) approve of the continuation of the
military campaign, only 16 percent are for
a dialogue with the armed factions in
Chechnya; 37 percent are convinced that
the situation in Chechnya will deteriorate
further.
But tensions are increasing in Moscow
and Russia. During the hostage drama,
right-wing extremist organisations and an
«autonomous combat unit for Russian self-
defence» heralded retributional attacks
against citizens of Chechen background in
Moscow. An organisation of the Armenian
Diaspora warned its community that anti-
Caucasian sentiments amongst the Russian
public and the legal authorities do not
differentiate between the different
Caucasian ethnic groups. All «persons of
Caucasian nationality» would have to pre-
pare for reprisals. Armenians, traditionally
allied to Russia, are no exceptions.
Before the hostage drama in Moscow, the
situation regarding the Chechen conflict
was: the Kremlin cannot cope with the con-
flict, despite (or because of) the massive
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repression going on in Chechnya, and it
does not have the will to deal with it
politically. The negotiation option is
now being restricted more than before,
especially because the Russian Government
blames Maschadov for the Moscow attack.
Even before this, the recommendation of
negotiations with him was characterised by
a dilemma: either the differentiation
between the «moderate» Maschadov camp
and his «radical» opponents applies, then
this camp only represents one resistance
group amongst many, and he will not be
able to push through the results of the
negotiations amongst the rebels. Or it joins
its opponents, which would reverse the
criterion for differentiation that legitimises
it as a partner for negotiations. But how-
ever Moscow describes its military oppo-
nents in Chechnya  the negotiation option
can only be directed at them if the dirty
war in the Caucasus is to end.
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